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Abstract: Not long ago, eighty-five percent of Cuban trade was conducted through the the Soviet
Union's Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the US maintained a strict economic
embargo. Today, most Cuban trade is conducted with countries as diverse as Venezuela, China,
and Canada, and despite the economic embargo, the US is the largest source of food for Cuba.
The fall of the USSR in the early 90s forced Cuba into restructuring its trade, with widespread
repercussions throughout Cuban economic, political and social systems and the ideology behind
them. World-systems theory offers a theoretical framework that allows an understanding of the
transition of Cuban society within an international, national, and ideological context.
Contradictions in key areas of Cuban policy are specific manifestations of general
contradictions in the capitalist world-economy.
Cuba is largest Caribbean island and home to eleven million people split evenly between
male and female. Seventy-five percent of Cubans live in urban areas, including over two million
in the capital of Havana (CIA, 2011). The racial composition is sixty-five percent white, ten
percent black, and twenty-five percent mestizo or mulatto. The Cuban labor force consists of
five million people, seventy-eight percent of which are employed by the state (CIA, 2011).
Twenty percent of the labor force works in agriculture, and another twenty percent works in
industry. The remaining sixty percent work in service sectors, including education, medicine,
and tourism (CIA, 2011).
Cuba's 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) purchasing power parity (PPP) was valued at
$114 billion, with a per capita PPP of $9,900. The service sector, primarily tourist and medical
services, produced seventy-three percent of the GDP(PPP) (CIA, 2011). Four percent of the
GDP(PPP) came from agricultural products like citrus and coffee, and twenty-three percent
derived from industrial products like nickel, steel, pharmaceuticals, as well as agricultural
products like sugar and tobacco that need industrial processing to be a finished product. Cuban
exports, mostly nickel, medical or agricultural products destined for China, Canada, Spain or the
Netherlands, totaled $3.3 billion in 2010, while imports of oil, food, machinery, and chemicals
primarily from Venezuela, China, Spain and US totaled $10.2 billion (CIA, 2011).
Not long ago, the Soviet Union (USSR) was Cuba's largest trading partner, supplying
eighty-five percent of Cuban imports and receiving the vast majority of Cuban exports in sugar,
citrus, and nickel (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). The neoliberal restructuring of the USSR in the late
80s and early 90s forced Cuba into restructuring its trade, with widespread repercussions
throughout Cuban economic, political and social systems and the ideology behind them. Twenty
years later, the Cuban state continues to struggle with this transition. Contradictions in Cuban
state policies since 1990 expose deeper contradictions within the fundamental structure of the
capitalist world-system.
World-Systems Theory
Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory examines the interaction between three
global social facts: the capitalist world-economy, the states-system, and the dominant global
culture. First is the capitalist world-economy, a large geographic zone with a division of labor
unbounded by a political or cultural structure, that originated in sixteenth century Europe and
Americas (Wallerstein, 2005). Capitalism, the structural prioritization of the endless
accumulation of capital, constantly expands in order to maintain the cohesion of the world2

economy's division of labor and accumulate profit from the subordinate states-system. Capitalist
economic priorities take precedence over the political priorities of individual states in the statessystem.
The capitalist world-economy manifests itself globally in the division of labor between
core and periphery production. Core production processes, like new technology and financing
industries, are characterized by their profitability, benefiting from the quasi-monopolistic
protection of a strong state (Wallerstein, 2005). Peripheral production processes, like textile
manufacturing and natural resource exploitation, however, are defined by their competitiveness
and location throughout many weak states. They are competitive processes because they do not
have strong states to protect markets and ensure high profits.
Primary capital accumulators in the capitalist world-economy, multi-national
corporations (MNCs), gradually grow larger as they increase in size through profitability from
economies of scale, eventually decreasing slightly in size from rising administrative costs and
risks (Wallerstein, 2005). MNCs in strong states are likely to reap the profitable, quasimonopolistic benefits of internationally protected markets for a few decades at which time other
producers enter the market and drive down profitability. The capitalist world-economy produces
systemic economic trouble as protected industries lose profitability and they have to relocate,
seeking lower costs of production. Semi-periphery countries use their relatively strong states to
compete for the newest discarded core processes, attempting to maintain their relative position
over other countries with only peripheral processes.
World-systems theory recognizes the second global social fact as the system of sovereign
states that originated from the Peace of Westphalia in seventeenth century Europe. The Peace of
Westphalia established rules for international relations that guaranteed autonomy between the
countries involved. Modern sovereign states centralize power by creating a civil and military
bureaucracy that legitimizes claims to boundaries, enabling subordination of regional powers to
the state power structure (Wallerstein, 2005). Another characteristic of modern states are
citizens, people with rights to actively and equally participate in the political process. The state
also protects property rights, creating rules against confiscation and externalizing costs of waste,
infrastructure, and resource replacement (Wallerstein, 2005). Property rights and cost
externalization protect the profit accumulation of capitalist world-economy.
Strong states produce the conditions for a society to become a nation-state. A nation-state
is the social creation of a mythology surrounding the state such as a long chronology and
defining characteristics (Wallerstein, 2005), further strengthening its legitimacy and cohesion.
Weak states formerly subjected to colonialism of strong nationalist states remain dependent on
key core sectors in strong states, hindering economic development within the weak state and
transforming it into a device for wealth accumulation.
A hegemony is a state that sets international guidelines, dominates the world-economy,
influences and spreads global cultural patterns with the minimal use of its powerful military
(Wallerstein, 2005). Hegemonic states offer stability necessary for capitalism to rapidly
accumulate profits after a lengthy period of global war and instability that threatened major
economic centers with subjugation to a political world-empire. Like quasi-monopolies,
hegemonic states must always fail as their focus shifts from economic efficiency to its new
political and military role. Rising powers eventually overtake the economic efficiency of the
hegemonic power and shift the interstate balance (Wallerstein, 2005).
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The final phenomena fundamental to world-systems theory is the global culture based on
French Revolution values of naturally progressive political change and citizen responsibility for
sovereignty (Wallerstein, 2005). Initially, conservative and liberal ideologies developed around
different attitudes toward socially-induced political change and citizen inclusion. Conservatives
stress caution in political change, believing the only people fit to enact such changes are those in
change of traditional hierarchical structures. Liberals, on the other hand, see social progression
as inevitable and believe educated specialists should lead the constant reform of traditional
hierarchies. The brief global revolution in 1848 encouraged the creation of radical ideas that
critiqued the dominant ideologies' methods of social progress (Wallerstein, 2005). Anti-systemic
movements pressing for inclusion of excluded groups as citizens arose from radical ideas of
conscious and direct social action to progress society. While anti-systemic movements
succeeded separately as workers', ethnic, and women's groups gained political power within their
states, the rising production costs it produced in the capitalist world-economy led to its global
expansion.
Upon realizing political power without achieving social change, anti-systemic
movements delegitimized the liberal ideology that social progress was inevitable and beneficial
(Wallerstein, 2005). New conservative and radical ideologies emerged through this freedom
from liberal ideology. Radicals adopted the strategy of a movement of movements, working to
unify different excluded groups and views into a single movement, while conservatives created
neoliberalism (Wallerstein, 2005). Neoliberal ideology promoted the removal of inclusive
policies won by workers, minority ethnicities and women that raise costs of production in order
to increase current rates of profit accumulation. Regressive neoliberal policies worsen systemic
contradictions not only by fighting inclusive state policies, but also through financial speculation
and unilateral use of military strength, producing systemic economic crashes and uncontrollable
violence (Wallerstein, 2005).
World-systems theory offers a theoretical framework that allows an understanding of the
90s Cuban transition within an international, national, and ideological context. International
relations take place within the states-system, which is subordinated to the capitalist worldeconomy. Cuba's relationship with the USSR changed in the late 80s and early 90s because of
neoliberal changes in the USSR's economic policy. The location of core and peripheral
production processes largely shape international relations through dependency. Cuba was
dependent on the USSR's core productive processes, and when Cuba lost the USSR as a trading
partner, it resulted in economic crisis. MNCs, agents of the capitalist world-economy, are also
increasingly important in international relations as they form powerful connections between
states, and Cuba has greatly increased its ties to MNCs from a multitude of countries since the
90s.
The Cuban state is necessary to understanding the 90s transition. Cuba is a country that
has developed a sense of nationhood largely defined by the quest for independence against the
advances of a hegemonic US. The modern Cuban state arose as a civil and military bureaucracy
during a revolutionary insurrection against US-backed President Fulgencio Batista staring in the
rural East during the 50s. The resulting revolutionary Cuban state greatly expanded the Cuban
citizenry and established a socialist state structure based upon the participation in the Communist
Party.
The ideological context contained in world-systems theory is essential for analysis of the
4

90s Cuban transition. The Cuban state has its roots in a socialist anti-systemic movement from
the 50s and 60s that challenged the dominant liberal ideology. The revolutionary Cuban state
transformed Cuban economic and social system into a more egalitarian and inclusive society.
Having successfully transformed the country, but not the world, Cuba now faces the ideological
divide between radicalism or neoliberalism.
Pre-90s
In 1959, after years of armed rebellion across Cuba, a general strike brought the antisystemic 26 of July Movement, headed by Fidel Castro, into power. Castro quickly reestablished
diplomatic relations with the USSR and reformed agrarian land holdings (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Agrarian reform established the precedent of nationalization of foreign-owned property and
expropriation of domestically-owned property. After US companies refused to refine oil from
the USSR, the Cuban government nationalized their refineries. Nationalization spread to other
large sectors of the Cuban economy, including banks and utilities (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). While
some countries, like Canada and Spain, received compensation for their nationalized property,
the US refused the Cuban government's offer, using its hegemonic power to establish a national
trade embargo and orchestrate sanctions from the Organization of American States (OAS)
(Aponte-Garcia, 2009).
Early trade deals with the USSR exchanging sugar for oil, machinery, and credits
solidified sugar as the base of Cuban economic relations with the USSR. Cuban dependence on
core production processes in the USSR led to Cuba adopting Soviet foreign and domestic
policies (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). In 1968, not only did the Cuban government strengthen its ties
to the USSR as it invaded Czechoslovakia, but it also carried out the expropriation of 57,000
small businesses, effectively completing the nationalization of the economy (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
During the 70s, Cuba's economy increasingly resembled the state-run, centrally-planned
Soviet economy. In 1972, Cuba joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA),
the USSR's centrally-planned international trading bloc, which banned members from engaging
in trade with countries outside of the CMEA (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). By the late 80s, economic
problems had led the USSR to begin liberalizing through glasnost and perestroika. Cuba
responded with Rectification, new policies combating corruption and improving productivity and
efficiency without introducing neoliberal reforms to its political or economic systems (AponteGarcia, 2009).
Early 90s
In the early 90s, the USSR disbanded the CMEA. Due to internal and external pressure,
most Communist leaders distanced themselves from Marxist-Leninist centralized economy,
enacting neoliberal reforms to develop a market-oriented economy and increase ties to the
United States. Cuba found itself increasingly isolated without military support or trading
partners. In 1992, Russia reduced its supply of military training and supplies to Cuba to a cashonly basis (Pérez, Jr., 2011). No longer protected by the Soviet Union and denied access to
major markets by strong Western states, Cuba was subjected to the full force of the international
capitalist economy as a peripheral country without access to core products.
The United States used Cuba's isolation to strengthen its economic embargo and exert
some control over Cuban trade during the transition. President George H.W. Bush issued an
5

executive order banning ships engaged in trade with Cuba from US ports. Later in 1992, US
Congress passed the Toricelli Act which extended the port ban for six months after a ship's last
visit to Cuba, banned US subsidiaries from trading with Cuba, authorized the President to
withhold economic aid to all countries that provide aid to Cuba, and openly supported nonviolent
regime change in Cuba (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Cuba found itself thrust into new unequal international
relations with a global hegemony in control of core technology and finance sectors limiting
Cuban industrialization and development. Expression of the hegemonic power of the US caused
many businesses to withdraw from Cuba. Early in his first term, President Clinton enacted an
executive order banning all travel and remittances to Cuba (Pérez, Jr., 2011). US policy was
designed from a hegemonic perspective that saw an opportunity to deepen popular discontent in
Cuba through economic isolation in order to induce political mobilization for neoliberal, pro-US
regime change.
Unable to secure alternative access to core products and services, imports of oil, food,
raw materials, spare parts, fertilizer, and feed declined significantly. Cuban industrial production
decentralized and downsized with half of factories closing in the early 90s. Agricultural
production in eleven of the top fifteen top agricultural commodities declined, and many sugar
mills closed, ending a way of life for thousands of people. Cuts in production and employment
led to the displacement of twenty percent of the population (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Hunger and
sickness ravaged the Cuban population because shortages in food, feed, medicine and medical
equipment limited the extent and quality of rations, healthcare, and education. Most consumer
goods disappeared from state run stores and the scarcity of oil led to blackouts and the
replacement of vehicle traffic with bicycles and animals. The Cuban government amassed a
budget deficit of 30% of its GDP in 1993 due to efforts to preserve social gains in education,
healthcare, nutrition and employment (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
During the early 90s it became impossible for Cubans to live their ordinary life. The
Cuban economy shrank 40% from 1990 to 1993 (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Instances of individual
dissent, such as graffiti, workplace theft and absenteeism, increased among the Cuban
population. The informal economy expanded from $2 billion in 1989 to $14.5 billion in 1993
based on the resale of rations and embezzled resources. The growth of the informal economy
contributed to the further devaluation of the peso and state salaries (Valdéz, 2002). The peso
economy also experienced brain drain as skilled workers left the state economy in favor of
economic opportunities through emigration, the informal economy, or the emerging tourist
service sector.
The decline of the state run economy and rise of the informal economy signaled changing
relations between the state and its citizens. Cubans began losing faith in the ability of the state to
meet their needs. Cuban youth increasingly attempted to escape their uncertain future through
emigration, suicide, and drug use (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Many young Cubans delayed getting
marriage or parenthood causing marriage and birth rates to decline. Religious activity also
revived among the Cuban populace in the early 90s signaling a loss of legitimacy for the state's
atheist and socialist anti-systemic ideology. Cubans embraced many religions, including
Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Santeria, an Afro-Spiritualist religion (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
In order to retain people's loyalty during austerity measures, the government had to create
a new strategy to mobilize the population. This new plan for mobilization, the Special Period in
Peacetime, came from measures drawn-up in preparation for a potential war-time scenario.
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Central to this strategy was the equal distribution of hardship to forge consensus, reduce
inequality, and ensure that all received some of the scarce necessary goods (Valdéz, 2002). The
government severely cut production across the economy and implemented new, reduced rations.
Nationalistic appeals to the notion of patria, or fatherland, was essential to maintaining
consensus during the Special Period. The notion of patria has its roots in the late 1800s struggle
for Cuban independence against the colonial Spanish and domestic annexationists who
advocated becoming a US state (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Patria fostered a liberal sense of
responsibility to create Cuban citizens in order to participate in and influence political changes
within the country. Coupled with the notion of a “Free Cuba,” or Cuba Libre, patria formed the
basis for the development of the Cuban nation-state. Appeals to patria during the early 90s
legitimized sacrifice for the country and united Cubans behind a national goal to remain
independent of foreign domination, particularly from the US.
While patria helped sustain consensus, it also restricted dialogue among the Cuban
people since the government aligned itself so closely with the defense of patria that any critique
of government policies could be skewed as an attack on the very idea of an independent Cuba.
Simultaneously, however, the Cuban Communist Party decentralized party functions to local and
regional organizations and introduced secret-ballot election of party officials. In 1992, the
Cuban government adopted direct, secret-ballot election of provincial and national assembly
members (Pérez, Jr., 2011). While limiting dialogue outside of governmental political structures,
the Cuban government also worked to expand citizen participation in the existing political
process through decentralization
While the Communist Party and Cuban government embraced limited political
institutional decentralization, the government drew the line at economic decentralization.
Government hardliners reaffirmed their commitment to anti-market principles in the early 90s
(Pérez, Jr., 2011), marginalizing any pro-market reform Cubans participating the political
process and eliminating public discussion of such reforms. Despite expanding citizen
participation in the political system, the state restricted the discussion of reforms within the
political process by making it clear that the state-run economy was non-negotiable.
The Cuban economy, however, needed systemic reforms if it was going to provide Cuban
citizens with their needs. Cuban trade was structured around natural resource exports and an
increasing dependence on imports (Monreal, 2002). This dependence on imports of core
products, while manageable under the CMEA, in the capitalist world-economy created an
extreme imbalance of payments. Further exacerbating the imbalance of payments in the early
90s was an increase in the price of oil coupled with a decrease in the price of sugar (Pérez, Jr.,
2011), one of Cuba's main peripheral production processes. Cuba's imbalance of payments and
the international economic conditions reflect the significant value of access to core production in
stabilizing an economy.
The early 90s crisis necessitated reintegrating the Cuban economy within the capitalist
world-economy and seeking new sources of core products and services, such as technology and
finance. The Cuban government reversed its attitude toward foreign investment, openly courting
foreign investors to participate in joint ventures or contractual associations with profit sharing
(Pérez Villanueva, 1998). In order to better attract foreign investors, the government began to
formally decentralize some aspects of the domestic economy. One such move during the Fourth
Communist Party Congress in 1991 was to re-legalize private services and establish limited
7

property rights (Pérez, Jr., 2011). This signaled to the actors in the capitalist world-economy that
the Cuban state was beginning to recognize liberal standards for states, including the protection
of property.
European, Canadian, Latin American, and post-Communist MNCs took advantage of this
opening, investing primarily in tourist, mining, and agricultural sectors of the Cuban economy.
The government allocated scarce resources to the development of these sectors, attracting
foreign capital and managers and promoting infrastructure development (Monreal, 2002). Cuba
also found international support in its fight against hegemonic US policies that attempted to set
the conditions for Cuban international relations. Many nations spoke out against the Toricelli
Act because it violated their own national sovereignty by applying US law to subsidiaries of US
companies regardless of their national location (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Mid 90s
In 1993, the Cuban government legalized the possession and limited use of foreign
currency among the Cuban citizenry. This greatly expanded the opportunities for investment in
Cuba and further allayed fears of nationalization and expropriation. Remittances of US Dollars
(USD) increased substantially, despite US limitations on the amount remitted and high fees on
money transfers to Cuba. Most remittances to Cuba are sent through mulas, reliable, regionallybased money smugglers (Eckstein, 2004). Remittances from states with core production
processes are becoming an increasingly important source of funding for developing countries
without preferential access to core funding services. Rising remittances signaled the beginnings
of new relations based on transnational bonding between Cuba and its diaspora.
The Cuban state encouraged travel between US and Cuba and lifted all restrictions on
emigration to the US in 1994. The subsequent wave of Cuban emigration overwhelmed the US,
and President Clinton reversed the long-standing policy of automatic asylum for Cuban refugees,
establishing a naval blockade off of Cuba's northern coast (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Over 21,000
Cubans left Cuba in makeshift rafts and boats during the first month of the blockade as it greatly
reduced the distance Cubans had to travel in order to enter US custody; US ships were twelve
miles away from the Cuban coast, as opposed to the Florida shores ninety miles away. The US
and Cuba signed an immigration pact shortly after establishing a US immigration quota of
20,000 Cubans per year in exchange for the Cuban government reinstating immigration laws and
curbing illicit emigration, their first treaty since the early 60s (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
New economic issues arose from the introduction of foreign currency to the Cuban
economy. Remittances fueled liquidity and the growth of the informal economy, resulting in
inflation and erratic informal conversion rates between pesos and USD ranging from twenty
pesos to the dollar to 130 pesos to the dollar (Eckstein, 2004). The introduction of USD
fractured the formal state economy, already under pressure from a competitive informal
economy based on USD, into profitable enterprises with access to foreign USD flows,
concentrated primarily in tourist, mining and agricultural sectors, and state-run subsidized
enterprises with access to Cuban pesos only.
The government reinforced its commitment to liberal values with neoliberal austerity
measures reorganizing and reducing the state ministries in order to reduce the cost of
administration. State subsidies and salaries were cut (Valdéz, 2002). Technocrats, while still a
minority in the cabinet, were allowed to increased their presence (Corrales, 2004). By 1995,
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new bank accounts, stores, taxes, and currency exchange houses catered to possessors of USD,
while granting the state limited access to the USD pouring into the Cuban population through
remittances.
Dollarization of the economy and the reorganization of state structures were signals of a
generally increasing liberalization of government policies. During the mid-90s, the government
ended the state monopoly on employment, production and distribution. A private formal
economy developed in over 160 sectors, involving more than 200,000 individuals (Pérez, Jr.,
2011). Government banks created loans for self-financing. Eighty percent of state land was
redistributed to co-ops and private farmers (Pérez Villanueva, 1998). Some private farmers
experienced increased autonomous wealth and created more than 300 farmers' markets, but many
co-ops suffered from centrally-planned distribution, prices and production plans as well as state
restrictions on membership and farm inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, fuel and equipment
(Corrales, 2004).
Public dissatisfaction over falling living standards produced over fifty dissident groups
representing around 1,000 members during the mid-90s. Cuban citizens increasingly looked to
participate and shape political processes alternative to the existing state structure. Antigovernment protests occurred in 1993 and 1994, and also in 1994, Cuban youth rioted in
Malécon (Pérez, Jr., 2011). By 1995, small press groups united into the Independent Press
Bureau of Cuba (Otero & O'Bryan, 2002). The government, however, remained intolerant of
political opposition. The state publicly questioned the legitimacy of dissident groups with ties to
the US, a damaging charge fed by the Toricelli Act and public mistrust of the US.
The reforms of the mid-90s integrated the Cuban economy into the capitalist worldeconomy enough to recover economic growth, the goal of a capitalist economy. Key to this
integration into the capitalist world-economy was the 1995 Foreign Investment Act (FIA). FIA
legalized profit repatriation and tax exemptions for foreign companies investing in Cuba
(Aponte-Garcia, 2009), neoliberal reforms designed to reduce the cost of production for MNCs.
Cooperation between the Cuban government and MNCs from sixty nations resulted in 400 joint
ventures in thirty-five economic sectors, including tourism, mining, pharmaceuticals, and
medical equipment (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Both production and consumption expanded and the state
began reducing its trade defecit.
Economic growth recovery, however, came at a huge cost to Cuban society. Forty
percent of the population had no access to remittances or the profitable dollar sectors of the
Cuban economy, while dollar access for the other sixty percent was mostly erratic. White
Cubans in Havana benefited most from remittances, reestablishing urban and racial inequalities
(Eckstein, 2004). Socio-economic inequality increased due to the accumulation of foreign
currency. Unequal access to USD allowed some Cubans to earn an income twenty-five times the
amount of other Cubans in the late 90s (Pérez, Jr., 2011). In a return to pre-1959 social
conditions, Cubans were banned once again from patronizing hotels and beaches reserved for
wealthy tourists.
Rising inequality from neoliberal reforms eroded the morality of the Cuban peso
economy and revolutionary value system, while erratic USD access prevented the solidification
of a bourgeois class independent of the state (Eckstein, 2004). Only a small number of Cubans
maintained regular access to USD, and the state was in the position to regulate who had access to
positions the dollar economy, encouraging loyalty to the government. Interest in education
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dropped among both the Cuban government and population when the Minister of Higher
Education reduced the number of students admitted to universities (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Teacher
morale dropped, and Cubans increasingly left their studies or low-paying jobs in the peso
economy for higher-paying positions in the formal or informal dollar economies.
Late 90s
In 1996, US Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, pressuring foreign institutions and
individuals engaged in business with US property in Cuba nationalized in 1960. The HelmsBurton Act permanently extended the embargo until a non-Castro-led government began reforms
including clear steps toward organizing multi-party elections and returning nationalized US
property (Pérez, Jr., 2011). The Helms-Burton Act enshrined into law the full scale of US
hegemonic interests in the future development of Cuba. US-Cuban relations could not resist
improving after reaching a new rock-bottom with the Helms-Burton Act.
By the late 90s, the conditions were right for the Cuban state to begin improving its
relationship with the US. Pragmatic neoliberal reforms committed Cuba to integration into the
capitalist world-economy, and the recovery of growth in the mid-90s signaled the Cuban
economy's compatibility with capitalism. In 1998, the US and Cuban Coast Guards began
communication and cooperation on anti-drug trafficking measures and air traffic was
reestablished between the two countries. President Clinton authorized cultural and educational
travel programs, setting a daily spending limit of $167 for tourists and legalizing quarterly
remittances of $300 (Pérez, Jr., 2011). By 2000, the US had legalized limited commercial food
exports to Cuba catering to the interests of multi-national agra-business producers of corn,
wheat, soybeans, wheat, and livestock located within mid-western states.
The Cuban government continued neoliberal reforms, primarily focused on reducing the
cost of its political structure, in the late 90s. In 1997, the Fifth Party Congress expressed support
for the reforms of the 90s and reduced the number of central committee members (Pérez, Jr.,
2011). The Cuban military faced significant cuts during the 90s as well, with an eighty-four
percent decrease in military personnel between 1989 and 1999 (Corrales, 2004). The Cuban
government created free trade zones in two tourism hot-spots on the northern coast, Havana and
Mariel (Pérez, Jr., 2011), and enacted a program of improving the efficiency of state enterprises
through decentralization of management and increased access to technology (Aponte-Garcia,
2009). The Pope's visit in 1998 was another example of the Cuban state fortifying its
liberalizing image. Also beginning in the late 90s, peso to USD conversions stabilized at around
20-25 pesos to one USD and MNCs received the first contracts to explore oil fields off of the
north coast (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
While Cuba continued neoliberal reforms in the late 90s, new reforms deliberately failed
to have the intensity or breadth of the mid 90s reforms. Hardliners in the government pushed for
developing existing state enterprises over potential business deals with MNCs (Corrales, 2004).
Despite the economic rebound, economic and industrial capacity were still below 1989 levels,
and Cuban exports were largely dependent on exploitation of natural resources. By 1999, sugar,
minerals, tobacco, and fish consisted of 82.6% of exports. Tourism, the fastest-growing
economic sector, was also dependent on natural resource exploitation (Monreal, 2002). Most
tourist resorts were constructed on fragile coastal ecosystems because of their natural beauty.
Substantial restrictions were left on the partially liberalized domestic private economy
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because reforms slowed after the recovery of economic growth. The government did not enact
price reforms addressing the dual currency economy, and participation in the decentralized
private economy peaked at around ten percent of the workforce, then declined (Corrales, 2004).
The state maintained tight control over access to the most profitable economic sectors, those
with access to foreign capital and management, while the small, domestic private economy was
subject to limited property rights due to selectively enforced anti-profiteering legislation
(Corrales, 2004). Some overly-profitable paladores, small restaurants operating out of homes,
came under bureaucratic attack from the government, increasing regulation to the point of
forcing many paladores to close.
Heavy-handed government regulation through fees, registration and taxes discouraged
entrepreneurs from starting state-registered small businesses and stimulated growth in the
informal economy. Selective enforcement of laws provided the government with a degree of
control over the informal economy. In 1997, the state increased repression of entrepreneurs
skirting the laws, disbanding many prosperous markets and small businesses (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
By repressing individual ways of living, the government reinforced its cultivation of a small
number of state-sponsored profiteers, encouraging party loyalty (Corrales, 2004).
Similarly, the Cuban government repressed independent political activity during the late
90s. Following the scheduling of the first national meeting of the Cuban Council in 1996, the
government arrested dissident leaders and worked to remove dissident groups' public presence
(Otero & O'Bryan, 2002). The state cracked-down on independent media, and, in 1999, National
Assembly Law 88 criminalized collaboration with the US in any anti-government activities
(Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Early 00s
Around the turn of the millennium, Cuba's economic strategy was yielding uneven
progress and erratic growth. Tourism and mining industries received the most foreign
investment, and GDP growth rates from this time ranged from just over one percent in 1998 and
2003 to more than five percent in 2000 (Pérez, Jr., 2011). The number of joint ventures between
the Cuban state and MNCs stabilized with very little growth (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). On
September 11, 2001 Osama bin Laden's terrorist attack involving flying hijacked commercial
airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon greatly damaged global economic growth
and peripheral sectors, like tourism, especially. In the face of these economic difficulties,
changes in the Cuban cabinet ended with conservative loyalists filling positions rather than
reform-minded technocrats (Corrales, 2004).
Agricultural production in Cuba was also hit hard by the economic downturn. Sugar
production halved from 4.5 million tons in 1996 to 2.2 million tons in 2003 (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
The collapse of the sugar industry called into question the basis of the Cuban economy and
resulted in a lack of loans needed to keep the struggling economy functioning. In 2002, the
government closed half of its sugar mills, releasing 100,000 workers. This move was a response
to economic adversity and not a neoliberal reform because these workers did not necessarily save
the state money; they were guaranteed wages, schooling, or land from the government as a
condition of their firing (Pérez, Jr., 2011). A few mills were preserved for the tourist sector as
museums of a vanishing lifestyle and some former mills were slated for reforestation programs.
Most land from the mills was sold or leased to domestic entrepreneurs with the purpose of
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diversifying and decentralizing agriculture (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Cuba faced not only economic pressure from the capitalist world-system during the early
00s, but also hegemonic political pressure from the US following the election of President
George W. Bush in 2000. The state of Florida was crucial to President Bush's election, and the
conservative Cuban exile community exerted new influence on the President. In 2002, President
Bush reiterated hostility toward the Cuban government; the US expelled Cuban diplomats and
began to assist dissidents openly (Pérez, Jr., 2011). In response to the renewed hostility and a
weakened USD, the Cuban Central Bank reduced the role of USD in local transactions, banning
the use of US coins in retail and ending the use of USD as the currency of internal exchange
between state enterprises (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
In protest to the open support the US was lending to dissident groups, the Cuban
government officially restricted US diplomats' movement. The US diplomats then hosted
meetings for dissident groups in Havana (Pérez, Jr., 2011). In 2003, seventy-five Cuban activists
were arrested for conspiracy and collaboration with the US, producing sanctions from the EU.
President Bush suspended cultural and education programs, made boat and air travel suspicious,
and heavily restricted travel and remittances (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Travel and remittance privileges were limited to only those with nuclear family ties to
Cuba. The new policy reduced travel to a total of two weeks every three years, with a spending
limit of $50 per day (Pérez, Jr., 2011). The new regulations divided the Cuban-American
community. Migrants who arrived in the US before 1980, while consisting of forty percent of
the Cuban-American population, made up seventy percent of Cuban-American voters (Pérez, Jr.,
2011). Having migrated for social rather than economic reasons, the pre-80 migrant community
largely supported the new restrictions on travel and remittances. Not only did recent Cuban
migrants not support the policy change, but the new restrictions were renounced by everyone
from Fidel Castro, to Cuban Catholic Bishops and dissidents (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
While the US increased its political hostility, it also increased trading ties with Cuba.
The economic ties established between Cuba and the US are characterized by the flow of
peripheral products from the US to Cuba in exchange for hard currency. Cuban imports of food
from the US increased from $30 million in 2001 to $257 million in 2003 (Pérez, Jr., 2011). US
imports were the largest source of food, totaling twenty-five percent of food imports, making the
US Cuba's fifth-largest trading partner. US travel to Cuba also remained significant with
210,000 travelers in 2003 (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Cuba was moving away from using USD, however,
and when the Cuban Central Bank required all cash transactions to be made in a new, convertible
peso, they imposed a ten percent exchange fee on USD, with no exchange fees on other
currencies (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Renewed economic ties between Cuba and other post-communist countries contributed to
the minimal success of the Cuban economy under new global pressures. Russia strengthened its
economic and diplomatic ties to Cuba through credit and plans to expand cooperation in
agriculture, manufacturing, science and tourism (Pérez, Jr., 2011). China substantially increased
its loans to, and investment in, Cuba from $775 million in 2005 to $3 billion in 2008. After a
series of hurricanes in 2008, China provided valuable foreign aid and humanitarian assistance
(Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Also challenging US hegemony in Cuba was a deepening divide between the US and
Latin America. Populist, progressive governments that rejected neoliberal US foreign policies
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and embraced socialist Cuban domestic policies came to power in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Chile (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). More Latin American governments advocated for Cuban
reintegration into the Organization of American States (OAS), but the notion was rejected by the
US and its allies in OAS (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Cuba found an alternative regional integration
program in the Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA). ALBA was created in 2005 when Cuba and
Venezuela signed the first Strategic Agreement, establishing fair and solidarity cooperation on
trade, investment, energy, health and education (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). Venezuela agreed to
provide the oil to fulfill a majority of Cuba's energy needs at preferential prices in exchange for
the services of Cuban educational and medical personnel. In addition to Cuba and Venezuela,
other members of ALBA include Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
and Dominica (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). ALBA can be seen as a movement of movements to the
extent each member represents an anti-systemic movement.
Tourism also emerged as a profitable base for the Cuban economy. Earnings from
tourism totaled $2.4 billion in 2008, up from $530 million in 1993. By the late 00s, Cuba was
the fifth most popular Latin American tourist destination, responsible for half of Cuba's foreign
exchange earnings and 100,000 direct jobs (Pérez, Jr., 2011). While a necessary replacement for
the loss of the sugar industry as the base of the Cuban economy, tourism was still a peripheral
process. Cuba's weak position within the capitalist world-economy did not allow Cuba to
advance into the semi-periphery by developing a core industry as the basis of the economy.
Late 00s
After experiencing a life-threatening illness in 2006, Fidel Castro transferred power of
the civil bureaucracy to his brother Raúl Castro, head of the military bureaucracy, officially
stepping-down from his positions of power in 2008 (Pérez, Jr., 2011). Raúl Castro quickly
adopted the rhetoric of change and enacted largely symbolic reforms. Although few Cubans
could afford access to them, he lifted restrictions on tourist facilities and some consumer goods
(Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Castro also sought to renew diplomatic relations with the US, a move rebuffed by
President Bush. In 2008, Cuba signed UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which ensure political rights, civil freedom and the rights
to employment, fair wages, social security, education, and high standards of physical and mental
health (Pérez, Jr., 2011). EU relations began to warm after the Catholic Church negotiated the
release of around sixty political prisoners (BBC News, 2010a).
Relations with the US improved with the election of President Barack Obama in 2008.
President Obama revised the US strategy for hegemony in Cuba, increasing ties between US and
Cuban citizens in order to promote liberal ideology and encourage neoliberal reforms. The
Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act lifted President Bush's restrictions on travel and remittances, and,
in 2011, the US renewed cultural and educational programs, expanded air routes, and raised
quarterly limits on remittances to Cuba (BBC News, 2011a). Improvements in US-Cuban
relations hit a snag when a US citizen arrested in Cuba was charged with spying (BBC News,
2011b). Former President Jimmy Carter, however, visited Cuba shortly afterwards in an attempt
to improve relations between the two countries, meeting with government and religious leaders
as well as dissident groups (Associated Press, 2011).
After nearly two decades of reforms, Cuban citizens still faced significant social and
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economic problems. The combination of a high life expectancy and low fertility rates produced
an aging population (Pérez, Jr., 2011). The vast number of young emigrants that saw no future in
Cuba exacerbated the aging of the population. Projections into 2025 predict that twenty-six
percent of the population will be aged over sixty (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
The global economic crisis in 2008, caused by speculative neoliberal policies in core
financial industries, damaged the Cuban economy through declines in its key tourism and nickel
industries. Foreign investment rates stagnated between eight and nine percent of GDP, and Cuba
accumulated a large foreign trade deficit (Pérez, Jr., 2011). In 2008, Cuban exports valued only
$4 billion, with eighty percent of foreign trade taking the form of imports (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
Sixty percent of food was imported in 2008, rising to seventy percent by 2010 (Mirhoff, 2010a).
The multi-currency economy resulted in a large portion of Cubans unable to earn a living
from their wages. Despite requiring new convertible pesos for all cash transactions since 2004,
the state continued to pay workers in the old, undervalued pesos (Pérez, Jr., 2011). The gap
between wages and cost of living encouraged workplace theft and corruption, which fueled the
high-priced informal economy.
The government responded to these problems with more neoliberal policies. In 2008, the
state reorganized its wage and salary structure, abandoning wage equality in the peso economy
(Pérez, Jr., 2011). The Cuban cabinet was again consolidated and reorganized, this time
incorporating more senior military officials into civil administrative positions (Pérez, Jr., 2011).
The military officials have more business experience than the political allies Fidel Castro
appointed as cabinet members. The military has been in charge of managing the government's
side of many joint ventures in the key tourism industry and others. Shortly after the formation of
the new cabinet, the government announced austerity measures to lay-off nearly one million of
the five million state employees. Local workers committees, however, have been reluctant to
recommend cutting their own jobs (BBC News, 2011c).
The state implemented redistribution of undeveloped state agricultural land with the
belief that decentralization of agriculture would boost domestic food production. In 2010, plots
of farmland were redistributed to 100,000 Cubans (Mirhoff, 2010a), with the state-sponsored
distribution method of on-farm produce stands promoted over the farmers markets that were
deemed too susceptible to profit accumulation in the late 90s . Also in 2010, the government
published a booklet outlining the newest neoliberal policy reforms aimed at expanding the
domestic private sector and foreign investment (Mirhoff, 2010b).
“Guidelines for Economic and Social Policies” emphasized public-private coordination
and rejected explicitly the principle of wealth concentration (Mirhoff, 2010b). The new policies,
however, were designed to stimulate the growth of domestic private economy, which necessarily
results in wealth accumulation. The government permitted selling real estate and hiring
employees. A new, scaled tax system incorporated not only sales, payroll, and social security
taxes, but also business deductions for raw materials and transportation (Mirhoff, 2010b).
Following upon the new policy to increase the private sector by 250,000, the government issued
75,000 self-employment licenses in early 2011 (Mirhoff, 2011).
The Future of Cuban Development
Cuban development since 1990 reveals contradictions in individual economic, social and
political policy areas, as well as deeper contradictions in the evolution of the state's general
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development strategies. Key to the Cuban state's social policy during the 90s and 00s was the
encouragement of emigration for subsequent remittances. The peripheral-based Cuban economy
is dependent on core financial services, and remittances are increasingly relied upon as a source
of finance because other financial services from the core remain closed. Encouraging
emigration, however, has negative effects on Cuban society as well. Emigration deprives the
domestic Cuban economy and society of individuals with education or skills, especially youth
who would otherwise support Cuban economic and social welfare for decades.
Alternatively, the Cuban government could discourage emigration and remittances.
Depriving the Cuban economy of remittances would slow already shaky economic growth, while
prohibiting emigration would increase domestic dissent from citizens disappointed with the
state's handling of economic and political reforms. Increased dissent would add further pressure
on the government to reform its political and economic structures.
Faced with two social policy options, both of them contradictory, the Cuban state must
choose between encouraging or discouraging emigration and remittances. I predict that the
government will continue to encourage emigration and remittances in the future in order to
alleviate domestic social pressure to reform. As a result, the Cuban state will be able to continue
the gradual pace of economic and political reforms. Another consequence will be the aging of
the Cuban population, which will place additional pressures on the recovering Cuban economy
as more elderly leave the economy and require social security.
The Cuban state's domestic economic policy is also contradictory. For much of the 90s
and 00s, the government simultaneously promoted neoliberal reforms designed to stimulate the
domestic private economy while espousing a radically anti-liberal rejection of wealth
accumulation and market forces. This contradictory economic policy stems from the reform of
Cuban economic policy from the late 80s and early 90s.
When the USSR began implementing neoliberal reforms to its economy, the Cuban
government responded with Rectification, abandoning economic liberalization completely in
order to focus on improving state-run enterprises. The contradictions from this policy revealed
themselves in the rise of the liberal informal economy and the international isolation of the early
90s economic crisis.
An important decision the Cuban government must make is whether to develop the state
or the private economy. Because nearly eighty percent of the labor force is employed by the
government, state enterprises will continue to receive government support. The private
economy, however, will continue to grow at the expense of participation in the state economy,
with its development ultimately taking priority over the state economy. Consequently, sooner
rather than later, the Cuban government will adopt a liberal faith in market forces and embrace
wealth accumulation. With the creation of a liberal economy, economic inequality will increase.
While some Cubans will grow rich from reform policies, many others will lose the social safety
net previously guaranteed by the state.
During the 90s and 00s, state-sponsored political reform largely centered around policies
designed to increase citizen participation in political processes without reforming existing
political structures. The rise of dissident groups and the erosion of faith in the state to meet
citizens' needs, evidenced by increased emigration and revived religious belief structures, made
it clear that political restructuring was necessary in order to build legitimacy and engage more
citizens in the political process.
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Political reform, however, is not without its own contradictions in the Cuban context. It
is likely that any future liberalization of Cuban political structure will be aided by direct US
intervention. While the US could resign itself to a passive approach to Cuban political
restructuring, relying on liberal economic reforms to spur liberal political reforms, the
hegemonic choice is always to intervene directly. Direct US intervention in political
restructuring in Cuba would ensure more rapid liberalization and greater compatibility with the
capitalist world-economy. However, it might also increase chances of political radicalization
later. Depending on the Cuban public's reaction to US interference, the political structure could
end up less legitimate than the previous structure, alienating even more Cubans from the political
process.
When the Cuban political structure undergoes further change, it will either liberalize or
radicalize. Political liberalization would benefit Cuban economic liberalization by promoting
further integration into the capitalist world-economy. If liberalization is co-opted by the
hegemonic interests of the US, however, it could provoke a radical anti-liberal restructuring of
political processes justified as a defense of patria. On the other hand, radical restructuring of the
Cuban political system that emphasizes active citizen participation is likely to become a barrier
to further integration into the capitalist world-economy.
Given these contradictions in the Cuban state's economic, social, and political policies of
the 90s and 00s, the government's general development strategy over the past twenty years must
also be seen as contradictory. During the Special Period in the early 90s, the government still
emphasized social development over economic development, continuing development policies it
had held for most of the three previous decades. The state maintained social services like
education, healthcare, and food rations to the best of its ability despite the abrupt loss of trade
and the ensuing depression. The contradiction in this policy is that despite maintaining
egalitarian living standards during the early 90s crisis, those living standards fell in proportion to
the decline of the economy. Shortages of essential goods during this time forced the government
to adopt policies that exposed the Cuban economy to the capitalist world-economy.
Since the mid-90s, the Cuban state emphasized economic integration into the capitalist
world-economy over egalitarian social development. The USSR switched priorities much more
swiftly and completely in the late 80s, yet both Cuban and Soviet policy changes have produced
the same general results in both societies. Both economies recovered growth after offering their
human and natural resources to the capitalist world-economy, and both societies underwent
significant differentiation in living standards as socio-economic inequality rose.
The future of Cuba will develop very differently depending on the government's future
prioritization of economic and social policies. While it is possible the state could reverse its
priorities and favor social development, it is unlikely this will happen soon. The militarization
of the Cuban cabinet following the transfer of power to Raul Castro signals that the government
is positioning itself to enforce potentially unpopular neoliberal policies. Many military officials
gained influential business experience through state-sponsored joint ventures with MNCs,
another important indicator of the future prioritization of economic development.
More probable than the prioritization of social development over economic development
is the continued integration of Cuba into the capitalist world-economy. Cuba's extreme
dependence on cultural and natural resources unavailable on the island makes this highly
probable. As in the 70s when Cuba's dependence on the core products and services of the USSR
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caused integration with the USSR's anti-liberal policies, so Cuba's dependence today on the core
products and services of the capitalist world-economy leaves it little choice other than to adopt
the liberal policies demanded of it.
The one alternative Cuba has to liberal integration into the capitalist world-economy is
integration with economic structures based around socialist policies, like ALBA. Within ALBA,
Cuba engages in trade independent of liberal market principles, similar to trade in CMEA during
the 70s and 80s. A major difference between ALBA and CMEA is their level of access to core
production processes. While CMEA was structured around the core products and services
available to the powerful USSR, ALBA relies on pooling the much more limited core products
and services available to a small number of Latin American and Caribbean member countries.
ALBA remains, however, a significant deterrent to full integration within the capitalist worldeconomy to the extent that Cuba pursues development within this alternative economic structure.
Contradictions in key areas of Cuban policy like economic, political and social
development are specific manifestations of general contradictions in the capitalist worldeconomy. The capitalist world-economy's global division of labor ensures that individual states
prioritize economic development over social development. Social development is seen merely
as a hindrance to capital accumulation within the capitalist world-economy. Neoliberal policies
that cut social programs that increase the cost of production best reflect this perspective. The
contradictions of social programs' subjugation to endless economic development are the greatest
threat ever posed to humanity, manifested in catastrophic levels of inequality and environmental
damage.
Countries that attempt to enact anti-liberal social policy, prioritizing social interests over
economic interests, are coerced into conformity through dependence on core production and
services in the US and EU. Dependency on core production processes leads to the dependent
state integrating with the economic and social systems that support those core production
processes. Because core products and services are profitable and supported by the capitalist
world-economy, economic integration with the systems supporting core products and services
must eventually lead to integration of the liberal values of the capitalist world-economy. Even
countries within the core find it increasingly difficult to prioritize social programs when their
core industries' profitability is threatened by competition from the semi-periphery of the worldsystem.
Semi-peripheral countries, like Brazil and India, with a mix of core and peripheral
production processes can support regional economic structures alternative to the capitalist worldeconomy for a limited time. Liberal core countries, however, provide stronger state support for
the profitability of core production processes. Through bilateral and multilateral trade and
currency deals, they can often hobble the development of alternative regional economic
structures. As with the USSR in the late 80s and early 90s, the increasingly dependent semiperipheral country then integrates with the dominant liberal capitalist world-system on the
latter's terms.
Economic prioritization over social policies and dependence on core production
processes expose the futility of state structures in defending the interests of its citizens against
exploitative economic practices. This contradiction in the capitalist world-economy is critical
because it exposes the illusion of liberal ideology's faith in market-induced, “naturally”
progressive social change. Awareness of the limits to social progress that the states-system
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imposes is essential to overcoming liberal ideology with a radically emancipatory ideology.
The remedy for exploitative and contradictory economic practices that cause climate
change and global inequality is not found in the liberal states-system. The only alternative to the
destructive contradictions in the capitalist world-system is for humanity to collectively shed the
liberal belief in passive, state-determined political change by uniting anti-systemic movements in
the active social creation of a sustainable society. A sustainable society actively invents social
relations that remove the contradictions of the capitalist world-economy by reestablishing
humanity's position within nature.
Few populations are as socialized to anti-systemic values as the Cuban people, however,
the liberalization of Cuban society is rapidly threatening the advances of radical ideology. While
Cubans have historically relied on the state to provide a decent standard of living, the socialist
Cuban state's failure to combat issues with equitable social development in the long term may
have broken the Cuban population's liberal faith in a state structure that advances social change
at the necessary rate. Cuban citizens are among the most prepared for a social revolution that
sweeps the capitalist world-economy from power, having lived the lessons of their own social
revolution that reversed many capitalist contradictions for a few decades. Until much more of
the rest of the world is as prepared as the Cuban population to abandon liberal ideology and
invent a socially and environmentally sustainable socialist society, however, the contradictions of
the capitalist world-economy will continue to manifest themselves in the development of the
Cuban state.
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